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In Guan et al.1, we analyzed the supply-chain effects of a set of stylized COVID-19 lockdown
scenarios, using a disaster assessment model2,3 in combination with a widely validated and
used global trade database4.  Despite significant data limitations at this early stage of the
outbreak, we provided a number of insights important for decision-makers attempting to
minimize economic loss and acting under significant urgency and uncertainty. Verschuur
and colleagues5 estimate global supply-chain dynamics using real-time ship tracking data
and voiced some concerns on our modelling study1 based on the comparison of their findings
with our modelling results.  While  we appreciate their complementary follow-up research
based on real-time data,  it  is  impossible  to compare  the  stylized lockdown scenarios we
developed with their data reflecting actual changes in the economy and policies that were
implemented in response to COVID-19. In addition, there are differences in modelling scope
and limitations of their data to reflect changes in global supply chains. We call for broad and
practical collaborations on integrating epidemiological modelling with economic forecasting
tools  to  provide  full  information  to  both  policy  and  public  stakeholders  about  effective
protective measures that are needed for public health as well as the economy. 
First,  in  Guan et  al.1 we did  NOT aim at  predicting the true cost  of  COVID-19; instead,  we
illustrate possible consequences under different types of lockdown scenarios, none of which has
been exactly imposed in that manner in any of the countries. It would have been impossible to
assess the real costs at this early stage given the differences (and day-to-day adjustments) in actual
responses across the globe. Forecasting the economic impact of the pandemic is impossible given
the dynamics of the situation. Instead, we identified the most important aspects of disease control
(such as strictness, duration, and recurrence of lockdowns) by comparing the losses under several
sets of idealized scenarios for containment measures and tested the sensitivity of these factors as
their impacts ripple through global supply chains. The combinations of strictness and duration are
based on stylized scenarios rather than the actual policies implemented in any particular country.
Thus, a comparison of our findings based on types of lock-down measures with real-time shipping
data reflecting changes in actual lockdown measures is not assessing in any way the validity of our
model and approach, as the underlying lockdown measures are not the same. While using real-
time data is important and complementary to our modeling approach, it is not suited to validate the
model given the differences of measures in the real world and those used in the scenarios. The
real-time  data  sketches  a  combined  trading  consequence  due  to  the  COVID-19  disruptions.
Attribution analysis is what modelling validations would require, but,  unfortunately, would be
premature at this stage.
Second, data from Verschuur and colleagues5 only reflects a specific part of international trade,
which  is  another  reason  why  their  results  are  incomparable  with  our  results  (in  which  all
international trade is considered). Although Verschuur and colleagues5 argue that “Maritime trade
accounts for approximately 80% of international trade in terms of volume”, about 40% of trade by
value,  however,  is  through  air6.  Considering  the  different  impacts  of  the  COVID-19  control
measures on air and sea cargo7,8, it is difficult to use the estimated results from ship tracking data
to represent changes in all international trade due to the pandemic. Change in online services is
another  factor  that  is  included  in  Guan  et  al.1 but  not  in  Verschuur  and  colleagues5.  During
COVID-19,  online  services  related  to  physical  production  will  decline  due  to  the  decline  in
physical production, while pure online services (such as education or meeting software services)
increased as other real-time data shows9. These increases in certain areas and losses in other areas
of the service economy are captured in our modeling approach but is not reflected when using ship
tracking data reflecting physical trade.
The changes in the trade structure under the impact of the COVID-19 have further contributed to
uncertainty  about  their  estimates  of  trade  value.  Verschuur  and  colleagues5 established  a
conversion table that  describes the probability that  a certain vessel type is  associated with an
economic sector using historical data. However, the rapidly changing trade structure during the
pandemic10,11 is likely to affect their estimated probability. This may be the most important reason
for the inconsistency between their estimates of disruption dynamics and the data released by the
General Administration of Customs of Vietnam (see details in the paragraph below where we
respond to their first concern). Moreover, it is very difficult to predict the load of each container or
each ship. In the shipping industry, there are many fully filled containers shipped from China to
the EU and the US. Some of the containers are sold and used within the US and the EU, the cargo
ships return with fewer containers or many empty containers. Hence, as can be seen from their
estimates, the accuracy in predicting Japanese trade data in volume (Supplementary Figure 1h)
and export trade data in value (Supplementary Figure 2b) is limited, especially for countries with
low trade value. Customs trade data after the crisis can be a useful source to analyze trading
pattern changes during COVID-19 and post recoveries.
After raising the above points, we would like to analyze their concerns one by one. For their
concerns on Vietnam: Figure 2 in Guan et al.1 shows that Vietnam would suffer about 5%-30% of
value-added loss in different scenarios. The latest report from the General Department of Vietnam
Customs shows that Vietnam’s total imports in the first half of 2020 fell by 2.9% and total exports
remained almost unchanged compared with 201910,11 (note that: the global lockdown scenarios we
set are more stringent than those in reality, so the model results are larger than the actual values).
Nevertheless,  we have all  witnessed some rapid increases in  trading volumes in  Vietnam and
China in the last quarter of 2020 due to the failure of effective disease control, leading to multiple
lockdowns and delaying economic restarts in the west.
For their concerns on en route goods: Verschuur and colleagues5 argue that the en route goods will
serve as a positive buffer to the downstream sectors, and slow down the forward effect. Guan et
al.1 modeled this aspect as the inventory of each sector. Inventory would play a buffer role in
reducing or delaying any forward propagation of shocks (see “CN” panel in Supplementary Figure
2 in Guan et al.1). However, production is restricted by a number of factors, and raw material is
one of those. During lockdown, limited labor availability is usually the key factor, compared to
raw material shortages, in rapid production declines (see “GB” panel in Supplementary Figure 2 in
Guan et al.1). Therefore, the steeper decline we simulated was because we considered factors other
than trade.
For the third concern: Verschuur and colleagues5 argue that heterogeneities exist by comparing
import and export dynamics of countries with similar  stringency  dynamics of control measures.
However, what we see is that the stringency index of the United States and the United Kingdom
from April to July is almost the same as the stringency index of China in March (Figure 1c in
Verschuur and colleagues5). We doubt the reliability of this indicator based on the actual situation
and the huge differences in how these measures play out across sectors.
Overall, Verschuur and colleagues5 provide an interesting data-driven approach to monitor aspects
of actual  international trade flows, even though their study cannot offer a direct validation or
information of our modelling results. Model-based and data-based approaches are both needed to
inform policy makers. In a more in-depth perspective, it is valuable to borrow ideas from mixed
frequency modeling strategies to integrate high-frequency data into a disaster impact assessment
system. 
Finally, the main qualitative conclusions of our paper seem more valid than ever. First, short and
intensive  lockdowns  able  to  stop  the  epidemics  appear  less  economically  costly  than  laxer
lockdowns that slow down the spread without eliminating the disease. Second, overcoming the
pandemic  is  a  global  ‘public  good’.  The  end  of  the  pandemic  depends  on  the  last  group  of
countries  effectively  implementing  protective  measures,  and  international  collaboration  –  and
support to the poorest countries – are essential to minimize the duration and economic cost of this
pandemics. 
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